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The three-legged stool of 
corporate governance reform 
by Jayne Barnard 
In March 1998, the London Stock Exchange issued some proposed changes 
to its Listing Rules. This document incorporates what has become known 
as the 'Combined Code' of corporate governance practices,  a project of the 
Committee on Corporate Governance  ('the Hampel Committee'). 
The Combined Code seeks to assemble in one place a code 
of best practice on corporate governance matters, the 
substance of which has previously been articulated in 
three separate documents, the Cadbury Committee Report 
(1992), the Greenbury Committee Report (1995) and the 
Hampel Committee Report (1998). 
The Stock Exchange's publication of the Combined Code, 
together with proposed changes in the Listing Rules, was part of 
a deal reached with the Hampel Committee  — the objective is to 
have a uniform understanding of what the corporate governance 
of public companies should look like (the Combined Code) and 
to have a mechanism of persuasion by which public companies 
that do not observe the agreed-upon best practices can be 
shamed into moving in the right direction (the Listing Rules).  In 
a nutshell, the proposed Listing Rules would require listed 
companies to report on any areas in which they fail to observe 
the best practices prescribed in the Combined Code (para. 
12.43A(b)). In addition, listed companies must provide a 
narrative summary of the ways  in which they have sought to fulfil 
the general principles set forth in the Hampel Committee 
Report (para. 12.43A(a)). 
The theory behind this structure  is that peer- and 
shareholder-pressure will stimulate those companies that fail to 
comply with the Combined Code's prescriptions  to improve 
their governance profile. There 
 is some evidence that this 
mechanism has been effective 
 in the past, particularly as regards 
growing compliance with the Cadbury Committee's 
recommendations (see Alice Belcher, 'Regulation by the Market: 
The Case of the Cadbury Code and Compliance Statement', 
1995 J Bus L  at p. 321). 
The Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel projects and the 
Combined Code, like similar projects in the US, represent 
 a  
laudatory effort at self-regulation by corporate leaders. Self-
regulation, earnestly embraced, can go a long way towards 
changing behaviour. But it is fair to question whether self-
regulation alone, or self-regulation as abetted  by essentially 
benign Listing Rules, can provide the stimulus necessary to 
ensure that public companies achieve the desired measure of 
reform. 
My scepticism is based, in part, on a tradition of multiple 
sources of persuasion. In the US, self-regulation (and self-
correction generated by adverse press coverage) forms just a 
small piece of the web of influences that has helped shaped 
corporate governance practices in American public companies. 
More significant are a triumvirate of influences which are 
virtually non-existent in the UK: 
(1) shareholder enforcement devices; 
(2) direct regulation by the government; and 
(3) corporate criminal responsibility. 
A number of other, less salient, devices also influence 
corporate governance in the US. These 'mechanisms of 
deputization' include a number of statutes that 
empower various constituencies  — employees, 
customers, competitors, outside accountants, and 
even random citizens 
 — to play a role in corporate 
governance reform. 
What follows is largely a recapitulation 
 of these 
sources of influence, together  with some commentary 
on how they have contributed to the successes of corporate 
governance in the US. I do not take the position that the US 
model provides exclusive guidance for other markets in 
attempting to implement corporate governance reform. It is 
helpful, however, to consider how the mechanisms  we will 
examine in these pages can: 
(1) compound the simple influence that self-regulation 
provides; 
(2) empower shareholders and others to play a more active 
role in the improvement  of corporate governance 
practices; and 
(3) create an environment of 'multiple awarenesses,' in which 
corporate executives and non-executive directors are 
constantly attuned to the expectations under which they 
are supposed to operate. 
The reader can decide for him/herself whether these sources 
of multiple awareness are so confining as to interfere with the 
profit-malting objectives of the corporate governance enterprise. 
(The Hampel Committee has cautioned that attention to 
'compliance' and keeping out of trouble may in same cases 
inhibit risk taking and the appropriate pursuit of profit, see 
Hampel Committee Report para. 3.7.) The fact that US 
corporate profits and stock market prices are at an all-time high 
suggests, but does not compel, a contrary conclusion. 
SHAREHOLDER ENFORCEMENT 
The first source of reinforcement that self-regulators can turn 
to in the US is the powerful and ubiquitous shareholders' 
derivative suit. Accommodated by every state statute under 
which American companies are incorporated, and facilitated in 
federal courts by the Feder-al Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 23.1), the shareholders' derivative suit 
is the primary mechanism by which, the traditional norms of 
directorial behaviour — the duties of due care, loyalty and 
attention — are enforced. Most of the more notorious (and 
sometimes troubling) examples of the use of this mechanism 
come to us from the state courts of Delaware: four cases in 
Particular, Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985); 
MacAndrews & Forbes v Revlon Inc 506 A 2d 173 (Del 1985); 
Paramount Communications Inc v QVC Inc (In re Paramount 
Communications Inc Shareholders' Litigation) 637 A 2d 34 (Del 
1994) and In re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litigation 698 
A 2d 959 (Del Ch 1996), define the genre and its reach. 
In Smith v Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed 
the slipshod practices of a prestigious board in Chicago and 
concluded that the haste with which they had approved a $7 15m 
take-over bid failed to comply with the minimum requirements 
for 'due care'. Noting that the board had spent less than three 
hours considering the terms of the deal, had discouraged 
alternative bidders and had failed to employ an investment 
banker to ratchet up the price of the company, the Supreme 
Court found that the company's individual directors — both 
executive and non -executive — could be held personally liable for 
the difference between the sale price actually achieved for the 
company and some higher, 'fairer' price. The case was ultimately 
settled for (and the shareholders ultimately received) an 
additional $23.5m ($18m of which is said to have been paid to 
the plaintiffs' attorneys). 
The Revlon case involved a hostile take-over attempt by Pantry 
Pride Inc (whose CEO (Chief Operating Officer), Ronald 
Perelman, was regarded as a parvenu by the target's incumbent 
management) of the cosmetics giant, Revlon Inc. Thwarted by 
Revlon, Pantry Pride and some of Revlon's shareholders sued the 
company and the Supreme Court held that, where the sale of a 
company is inevitable, the incumbent board must permit an 
auction to occur, even if management prefers one of the bidders. 
To do otherwise would violate the directors' duty to the 
shareholders. The QVC case reaffirmed the Revlon decision. In 
this case, also involving the efforts of a target corporation to fend 
off the advances of a so-called unsuitable bidder, the Supreme 
Court ruled once again that, where a change of control is  
inevitable, the incumbent board's only duty is to secure the best 
value reasonably available to the stockholders. (Both Revlon and 
QVC involved requests for direct judicial intervention into the 
decisions of a corporate board. By contrast, Smith v Van Gorkom 
and Caremark involved requests for monetary compensation.) 
Caremark arguably represents the high-water mark of judicial 
control over directorial functions. The case involved a provider 
of medical services charged with multiple felonies. Specifically, 
Caremark was charged with violating federal and state laws 
prohibiting providers from paying any form of kickback to 
physicians for referring Medicare patients. The company 
ultimately settled these charges by paying $29m in criminal 
fines, $130m in civil damages, and $5.5m in miscellaneous 
charges. (Caremark also entered into an agreement with the US 
Department of Health and Human Services to create a modern 
compliance program. It later paid an additional $98.5m to 
reimburse private insurers.) 
USEFUL DETERRENT 
imposing criminal liability on corporate defendants, as opposed to 
the individuals responsible for the crime, is not without its critics in 
Ow US (see, e.g., Jeffrey S Parker, The Blunt Instrument in Debating 
Corporate Crime (INS Lofquist, MA Cohen and GA Rabe, eds 1997); 
Jennifer Arlen, 'The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate 
Criminal Liability', 23 of Legal Stud 833 (1994)). Also, it is not a 
foolproof way to ensure that corporate governance practices are 
improved. Nevertheless, without the possibility of criminal 
prosecution and the substantial fines that can result from conviction, 
many more corporations would undoubtedly engage in clandestine 
illegal acts. 
The question in the derivative suit was whether Caremark's 
directors could be held liable to the shareholders for any portion 
of these payments. In fact that question was never specifically 
decided, because the case was settled and the court was asked 
merely to confirm, as required by law, that the settlement was 
'fair and reasonable'. The settlement did not involve any 
monetary payment, other than attorneys' fees. The heart of the 
settlement was the creation of a board-level Compliance and 
Ethics Committee and some other prophylactic gestures. In 
deciding that the answer was 'yes', Chancellor Allen (in dictum) 
stated that: 
`[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to 
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the 
board concludes is adequate, exists, and 	 failure to do so under some 
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses 
caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.' 
Though this language has been dismissed as 'not a statute or 
rule, not a holding of the Supreme Court, not on appeal, not 
scary and not necessarily right or wrong' by Delaware Chief 
Justice Norman Veasey, quoted in 'Corporate Compliance Issues 
After Caremark', Carp Off &Dir Liability, Lit Rep, 11 June 1997, it 
has had a powerful impact. In fact, together with the US 
Sentencing Guidelines discussed below, the Caremark decision 
has brought about a revolution in board attitudes towards in-
house compliance programs. Companies have scrambled to 
establish credible compliance procedures. Consultants have 
devised 'best practices' for the creation of a compliance 
program. Not surprisingly, experienced compliance officials are 
now able to command 'top dollar'. 
The derivative suit is not an unfettered right, and shareholders 
are often frustrated by the procedural and doctrinal 
impediments which are frequently placed in their way. Two of 
the most recurring vex.ations are the necessity of making a pre-
litigation demand (see Marx v Akers 88 NY 2d 187; 666 NE 2d 
1034 (Ct App NY 1996)) — exploring the history of the demand 
requirement and its varying applications in a number of states — 
and the pre-emptive capacity of 'special litigation committees' 
(committees comprised of disinterested board members who are 
authorised to request the court dismiss the suit, where it is 
thought not to be in the best interests of the corporation) (see 
Cuker v Mikalauskas 547 Pa 600; 692 A 2d 1042 (Pa 1997) — 
exploring the use of special litigation committees and adopting 
the guidelines set out by the American 'Law Institute (ALI) for 
determining when the requests of a special litigation committee 
should be honored. The business judgment rule itself (giving a 
presumption of validity to most directorial decisions) and 
especially the application of that rule to decisions regarding 
executive compensation (see Zupnick v Goizueta 698 A 2(1 384 
(Del Ch 1997) — dismissing a complaint alleging that a grant of 
stock options represented 'corporate waste' — are two other 
impediments that often limit shareholders' ability to implement 
the owners' will. 
Even with all of its shortcomings, however, it is hard to 
imagine what the state of corporate governance in the US would 
be today were the derivative suit not available as a 
backdrop against which most corporate 
governance decisions are made. Certainly the 
anticipation of litigation shapes many board practices 
today. Moreover the emerging willingness of 
institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs in 
shareholders' derivative suits gives those investors an 
important new weapon to use in the enforcement of governance 
norms. Which is, of course, as it should be. Back room cajoling, 
high-stakes negotiating, and even the publication of '
non-performing targets' lists can only go so far in achieving 
behavioral reform. The possibility of personal liability, or direct 
court intrusion into specific governance decisions, is the single 
most effective tool in enforcing directors' fiduciary duties in 
American corporations today 
GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT 
In the US, the direct enforcement of directors' common law 
duties comes via the shareholders' derivative suit. There are 
other, indirect, forms of enforcement, however, that originate 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC's 
authority, like that of any federal agency, is circumscribed by its 
enabling legislation. This means that the SEC cannot directly 
require companies to alter their corporate governance practices 
— in the US, corporate governance is a matter of state, not 
federal law (see Business Roundtable v SEC, 905 F 2d 406 (DC Cir 
1990)). But by regulating the public disclosures of public 
companies and occasionally by intervening in disputes regarding 
proxy solicitation, which is also within its jurisdiction, the SEC 
has some powerful tools with which it can influence governance 
of public companies. This is certainly true of companies in the 
financial services industry; over which the SEC has expanded 
powers. It is also true, however, of garden variety public 
companies whose directors have been slacking on the job. 
For example, in September 1997, the SEC issued a widely-
discussed report (-ensuring the directors of WR Grace & Co for  
failing to insure that the company had adequately disclosed some 
remarkable features of the former CEO's compensation package 
(see In the Matter of WR Grace &Co, SEC Exchange Act Rel 34- 
39157, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2038). 
Specifically, the former CEO was given the use of a company-
owned apartment with a market value of $3m and provided with 
a cook, driver, secretaries, nurses, and the use of the corporate 
jet. 'The value of these perquisites, when ultimately disclosed, 
was over $3m per year According to the SEC, the directors, both 
inside and outside, who signed off on the company's annual 
report, were required to make sure that these items were 
adequately disclosed. (The SEC has imposed detailed 
requirements regarding disclosure of executive compensation 
schemes. See SEC Exchange Act Rel 34-31327 (Executive 
Compensation Disclosure) (1992) describing in detail how 
executive compensation decisions are to be communicated to 
shareholders). By failing to interrogate the company's disclosure 
counsel, 'telling counsel exactly what they knew about the 
benefits, and asking specifically whether the benefits should be 
disclosed,' WR Grace's directors 'did not fulfil their obligations 
under the federal securities laws'. Explicit in the SEC's recitation 
of this matter was a condemnation of WR Grace's 'corporate 
culture' and the excessive influence the former CEO held over 
the board. Implicit in the SEC's report, moreover, was a 
criticism of WR Grace's executive remuneration practices. 
In 1994, the SEC issued a similar report reviewing charges 
that the CFO and other top executives of The Cooper 
Companies Inc, a medical supply manufacturer, had illegally 
used the company's funds to engage in securities fraud (In the 
Matter of The Cooper Companies Inc, as it relates to the conduct of 
Cooper's board of' directors, Exchange Act Rel 34-35082, 1994 
SEC LEXIS 3975). Commenting on the failure of Cooper's 
board to respond adequately to these charges — indeed, the 
board appointed one of the wrongdoers to serve as CEO, and 
gave him an off-site office from which he continued to run the 
company — the SEC concluded that Cooper's board had failed to 
take 'immediate and decisive corrective action.' The message 
was clear: when directors harbour defrauders, they, too, can be 
held liable for violations of federal law 
The SEC has issued reports like these only sparingly; but they 
do capture the attention of top business leaders and their 
lawyers. A public castigation from the SEC, even when 
unaccompanied by a specific enforcement action, has a powerful 
impact. The impact is even greater, of course, when the SEC uses 
its full range of enforcement powers to seek a cease-and-desist 
order against a company and its executives (see, e.g., In the Matter 
of Lee Pharmaceuticals, Exchange Act Rel 34-39843, 1998 SEC 
LEXIS 691), or to seek injunctive relief (including an order of 
restitution) against corporate top executives in a federal court 
proceeding (see, e.g., SEC v Eddie Antar 54 F 3(1 770 (3rd Cir 
1995)). 
In short, the SEC has a wide range of tools — from its bully 
pulpit to its power to fine and sanction — that arc employed in 
the cause of' corporate governance reform. Without the 
presence of a vigilant SEC, the vast array of public companies in 
the US (now totalling close to 20,000) would be far more prone 
to egregious lapses by their managements than is now the case. 
C RIM I NAL LIABILITY 
One might think it odd to refer to the federal criminal law as 
a mechanism of corporate governance reform, especially in a 
culture that does not recognize corporate criminal liability. In 
the US however, criminal liability itself and especially the 
existence of the US Sentencing Guidelines both have a 
profound, if' often belated, impact on the ways in which 
companies are governed. For example, in recent years, a number 
of public companies have been prosecuted criminally (or 
threatened with prosecution) in ways that had a direct impact on 
the companies' corporate governance practices and also on their 
personnel. In addition to the Caremark case, discussed above, two 
other recent examples — perhaps the best, but by no means the 
only ones — give a sense of how this mechanism can work. In 
each case, the criminal law violations were clearly symptomatic 
of systemic management problems and a lack of effective 
leadership at the top. 
Archer Daniels Midland Co 
In June 1995 the FBI raided the Decatur, Illinois, 
headquarters of Archer Daniels Midland Co (ADM), looking for 
evidence of price axing. ADM, an international leader in 
processed foods, was later charged with conspiracy to fix prices 
in the lysine and citric acid markets. When the dust had settled, 
ADM had paid $100m in criminal fines plus another $100m to 
settle civil lawsuits (including a shareholders' derivative suit 
brought against the directors for their negligence). On the plus 
side, the company's autocratic chairman and CEO, Dwayne 
Andreas, had been forced to retire as the CEO; his 'heir 
apparent', son Mickey Andreas, had been removed from the 
order of succession (he had, after all, been indicted in the price-
fixing scheme); institutional investors had been activated and, at 
the October 1995 shareholders' meeting, had made a strong 
showing in opposition to the re-election of the board. By 1996, 
the board had been reduced from 17 to 12 members, of whom 
three were new and ostensibly independent and a new CEO had 
been appointed. Finally, by 1997, ADM was no longer the 
lowest-scoring company in Business Week's annual 'best and worst 
of the boards' league table. As part of the settlement of a 
shareholders' suit, ADM agreed that only outside directors who 
were not on the board at the time of the price-fixing scandal, 
could nominate the 1997 slate of directors. 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation 
In the summer of 1997, word leaked out of a federal 
investigation of grievous overcharges against state and federal 
funders by Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, an 
American corporate giant owning 380 hospitals. The allegations 
suggested that Columbia/HCA had falsified thousands of 
reimbursement submissions, `upcoding' the levels of care 
provided and requiring unnecessary tests. All this had occurred 
in an environment of intensive growth and expansion. The 
driven CEO of Columbia/HCA, Richard L Scott, had set profit 
growth targets of 15-20% per year. This had resulted in deep 
cost cutting with resulting allegations of frequent faulty 
treatments. Rumours suggested that the amount of the  
overcharges might total as much as $500m. Together with 
criminal penalties, Columbia/HCA's exposure could be more 
than twice that much. 
Suddenly Scott and the company's president resigned and a 
new CEO was appointed. Within a few days, Scott's successor, 
Dr Thomas F Frist Jr, called for 'a complete overhaul of the 
aggressive culture established by Mr Scott', noting that, as a 
director, he had never been informed that there were any 
concerns relating to the company's Medicare reimbursement 
submissions. Frist promised to revamp the relationship between 
the CEO and Columbia/HCAs board. Within a few weeks, 
Columbia/HCA had appointed a full-time senior vice president 
for ethics, compliance and corporate responsibility. A few 
months later, the new CEO appointed three new outside 
directors to Columbia/HCA's board. The point, Frist 
emphasized, was to get away from Scott's old cronies and to 
appoint directors with a level of maturity and experience that 
reflected Columbia's size and role in the health care industry 
The company also announced a corporate reorganisation plan 
that would include a significant spin-off 'The Government 
actually did us a favour', allowed Frist, 'because it let us address 
an underlying issue, and that was the way you go about running 
this kind of company'. 
UK CONTRASTED 
In the UK, a business environment which, on the surface at least, 
looks much like that in the US, many of the mechanisms upon 
which WC rely in the US are weak or non-existent. This suggests 
two possibilities: 
(1) British business leaders are less rapacious and better behaved than 
American business leaders and do not require the web of 
enforcement mechanisms that Americans require to keep them on 
the right course; or 
(2) British business leaders are just as self-serving and/or negligent as 
American business leaders but, because there are so few 
mechanisms by which their misconduct can be detected, are 
getting away with a great deal of improper conduct. 
1 doubt that either is entirely the case. Still, the differences in the 
systems are striking. It is fair to wonder if these differences are the 
result of historical quirks or of genuine cultural differences. 
Imposing criminal liability on corporate defendants, as 
opposed to the individuals responsible for the crime, is not 
without its critics in the US (see, e.g., Jeffrey S Parker, 'The 
Blunt Instrument' in Debating Corporate Crime (WS Lofquist, MA 
Cohen and GA Rabe, eds 1997); Jennifer Arlen, 'The Potentially 
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability', 23 J Legal Stud 
833 (1994)). Also, it is not a foolproof way to ensure that 
corporate governance practices are improved. Nevertheless, 
without the possibility of criminal prosecution and the 
substantial fines that can result from conviction, many more 
corporations would undoubtedly engage in clandestine illegal 
acts. 'This is because the more conventional mechanisms for 
enforcing managerial norms — the shareholders' derivative suit 
and routine directorial monitoring — are unlikely to be effective 
in most areas of corporate crime because: 
(1) shareholders have little access to the necessary 
information; 
(2) there is little incentive for shareholders to act when the 
criminal conduct is profitable; 
(3) in the absence of some reward mechanism, shareholders' 
lawyers also have no incentive to convey a report of 
corporate crime; and 
(4) these same infirmities largely apply to members of the 
board of directors. Absent a stringent compliance program 
specifically involving the board (see below), directors are 
unlikely to be effective law enforcement agents. 
In addition to the existence of corporate criminal 
responsibility, a related influence on corporate governance in the 
US is the US Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, adopted 
in 1991 (USSG ch 8). These guidelines which govern the way in 
which corporations are sentenced (e.g. they determine the 
amount of the fine to be paid) include a number of 
incentives for companies to take prophylactic 
action to avoid prosecution. The strongest of these I 
incentives is the provision that enables a company that 
has adopted 'an effective program to prevent and 
detect violations of the law' (in the vernacular, a 
'compliance program') to receive a substantial 
reduction in any criminal fines incurred (USSG s. 
8C2.5(f)). The elements of an effective program — including the 
appointment of high-level executives to ensure that it is being 
observed from the `top down' — are clearly set out in the 
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG s. 8A1.2, App note (k)). The 
result of this provision, together with the impact of the Caremark 
case, discussed above, has been a dramatic increase in corporate 
compliance programs, many of which involve the board of 
directors. In addition a number of recent criminal cases have 
been resolved by the company agreeing: 
(1) to fire key individuals and/or give them up for individual 
prosecution; and 
(2) to create a strong compliance program, sometimes under 
monitoring by the court. 
In these cases, too, the board has often been involved. Legal 
advisors to corporations have recognised that the single best way 
to avoid corporate misconduct, with its attendant exposure to 
significant fines and adverse publicity, is to involve executives — 
including the directors — in the process of detection and 
deterrence. The sentencing guidelines have encouraged this 
awareness. 
MECHANISMS OF DEPUTIZATION 
There are several other, less direct, sources of influence over 
corporate governance practices. These include statutory and 
common law provisions, but each provides a mechanism by 
which non-participants in corporate governance activities can 
play an important role in unveiling misconduct, and can often be 
compensated far their services. The theory, if there is one, is that 
shareholders, being distanced from the decisions that give rise to 
corporate misconduct, cannot alone be empowered to bring 
wrongdoing executives to heel. Consigning detection of 
wrongdoing to the government, either at the SEC or through 
investigation of criminal charges, is also insufficient, even in an 
administration committed to pursuing corporate crime. Rather, 
a complex web of law enforcement mechanisms, with a wide 
range of incentives and persons authorized to initiate them, is 
the best guarantee that executives (and non-executives) will 
honour their societal obligations. In a nutshell, these 
mechanisms, and the people who have standing to activate them, 
include:  
• False Claims Act activated by any person (typically an employee); 
• Private Securities Litigation Reform Act activated by public 
accountants; 
• Federal antitrust statutes activated by any injured person 
(typically a competitor but sometimes a consumer); 
• Federal anti-discrimination statutes activated by any person 
believing themselves to be aggrieved (usually an employee but 
sometimes a person denied employment); 
• Federal environmental statutes with 'citizen suit' provisions 
activated by any person (typically a special interest law firm); 
and 
• Product liability actions activated by injured consumers. 
The False Claims Act (31 USC s. 3729ff.) applies to government 
contractors and anyone who submits 'claims' (typically invoices) 
to the federal government. The act has been applied to defence 
contractors, providers of services funded by Medicare, and 
drillers of oil on government land, among others. The key to its 
role in improving corporate governance is the `whistleblower' 
provision which permits 'any person' with knowledge of 
overbilling: 
(1) to bring a suit against the company to recover the 
government's overpayment; and 
(2) to receive a percentage (ranging from 15-3096) of the total 
amount recovered. 
In recent years, individual plaintiffs have been responsible for 
the recovery of nearly $2 billion by the federal government. In 
addition, their actions have brought to light systemic failures of 
management supervision at dozens of government contractors. 
The result has been the creation of the Defense Industry Initiative 
on Business Ethics and Conduct (a consortium of defense 
contractors committed to maintaining effective compliance 
programs); the establishment of top (vice president) level 
compliance posts at most major government contractors; 
widespread changes in contracting practices and the replacement 
of CEOs and others at the companies with the most egregious 
records. 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act includes a potent 
provision that requires that outside auditors for a public 
company include in their audit procedures specific procedures 
designed to detect illegal acts (15 USC s. 78j-1 Securities and 
Exchange Act, s. 10A). Where an illegality is detected, it must, 
unless it is 'clearly inconsequential', be reported to the 
appropriate level of management and also to the board's audit 
committee. Where, in the case of significant illegality, 
management fails to take appropriate corrective action, the 
auditor must then go directly to the company's full board. In 
turn, the board has one business day to convey the information 
to the SEC; if it fails to do so, the auditor must then contact the 
SEC itself Though this provision has not yet been tested, it has 
the potential not only to 'force the auditor to take his role in the 
identification and reporting of fraud more seriously' and to 
make the auditor 'the public's fraud detective', but also to 
engage board audit committees in addressing illegal activities at 
a far earlier stage of development than otherwise would have 
been the case. 
The federal antitrust laws, too, can play a role in improving 
corporate governance, as suggested by the discussion (above) of 
the ADM case. Under US antitrust law, interlocking 
directorships are prohibited (see 15 USC, s. 19; Clayton Act, s. 8) 
and price-fixing  — with its exposure to treble damages  — can also 
result in loss of position for those who run non-complying 
companies. Recently, for example, Ucar International Inc, a 
manufacturer of graphite electrodes, replaced its CEO and 
several top-level executives, shortly before pleading guilty to a 
massive international price-fixing conspiracy and paying a record 
$110m fine. 
Similarly, the federal anti-discrimination laws have proven to 
be influential in shaping corporate cultures and provoking 
personnel changes even at the highest levels of governance. Both 
at Mitsubishi (US) and Texaco Inc, for example, 
allegations of pervasive discrimination against 
women (in the case of Mitsubishi) and African- 
Americans (in the case of Texaco), have resulted in 
major policy overhauls as well as reassignments at the 
top. The saga at Astra USA  — a pharmaceutical 
company at which the CEO plundered the corporate 
treasury for his own (sometimes criminal) uses, 
committed personal and corporate tax fraud, and 
presided over a corporate culture that included the 
procurement of prostitutes as 'rewards' for top sales producers, 
rampant sexual harassment of female employees, discharge of 
'older' women and women who became mothers, and diversions 
of funds for executives' personal use  — became public solely 
because of a handful of employees who sought to sue for sexual 
harassment. The CEO, now in prison, was belatedly removed by 
his board of directors and the entire senior management staff 
was replaced. Without the aggressive efforts of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission together with the efforts 
of Business Week, which broke the story, the mismanagement  at 
Astra might have gone undetected for years. 
Finally, the 'citizen suit' provisions of US environmental laws 
and product liability suits under common law, also can have an 
impact on corporate governance practices, though this impact 
has rarely been felt. Citizen suits permit individuals to prosecute 
polluters and, in effect, 'stand in the shoes of the government'. 
Product liability actions permit injured individuals to sue 
manufacturers of dangerous products, recovering both actual 
and punitive damages. Occasionally, each type of suit has resulted 
in policy and personnel changes. 
THE BOTTOM LINE 
Though there are certainly some critics, a majority of 
Americans have concluded that multiple sources of influence, 
including regulatory statutes, statutes providing incentives for 
employees and others to blow the whistle on their bosses, 
shareholders' derivative suits, corporate criminal liability and, 
occasionally, direct government intervention, can collectively 
generate better corporate citizenship and better corporate 
governance than a rudimentary system of self-regulation. 
By contrast, in the UK, a business environment which, on the 
surface at least, looks much like that in the US, many of the 
mechanisms upon which we rely in the US are weak or non-
existent. 'This suggests two possibilities: 
(1) British business leaders are less rapacious and better 
behaved than American business leaders and do not require 
the web of enforcement mechanisms that Americans 
require to keep them on the right course; or 
(2) British business leaders are just as self-serving and/or 
negligent as American business leaders but, because there 
are so few mechanisms by which their misconduct can be 
detected, are getting away with a great deal of improper 
conduct. 
I doubt that either is entirely the case. Still, the differences in 
the systems are striking. It is fair to wonder if these differences 
are the result of historical quirks or of genuine cultural 
differences. 
Whatever the case let me dose this review with an 
observation: as the Labour government considers a retreat from 
Foss v Harbottle, the possibility of codifying corporate 
manslaughter, and a possible revision of company law, there will 
be many opportunities to create mechanisms designed to 
strengthen corporate governance in Britain. Each mechanism 
has its costs; each imposes another layer of expectation on 
corporate managers. As always, the question is one of balance. 
